Neuroscience and the Future of Chemical-Biological Weapons

Abstract

This study is concerned with the potential misuse of advances in neuroscience. Recently, fears surrounding the abuse of benignly-intended research in the life sciences --the dual-use problem -- have focused on 'Gain-of Function' experiments, in which deadly influenza viruses have been made transmissible through the air. However, many other aspects of the life sciences, besides the study of viruses, could be subject to hostile misuse. There is a century-long history of the development of novel neuroweapons, which is based on civil research and a vast, ongoing increase in research funding. These developments underpin an attempt to produce a mechanistic understanding of brain functions, which risk being subjected to misuse in the future. This study does not propose that this benignly-intended work be reined in, nor suggest that neuroscientists bear the sole responsibility for preventing the misuse of their work. However, they remain inextricably involved and should, one could argue, assume a certain level of accountability. Thus, this book sheds light on how they, and international security specialists, can work to bolster efforts to minimise the potential for misuse of modern neuroscience research. PART I: THE PAST -- 1. Neuroscience and the Developments of CBW -- 2. The Structure and Function of the Brain -- 3. The CBW Non-Proliferation Regime -- 4. The Dual-Use Challenge -- PART II: THE PRESENT -- 5. Modern Civil Neuroscience -- 6. Novel Neuroweapons -- 7. Implications of Advances in Neuroscience -- 8. The Search for Incapacitants -- 9. Bioregulators and Toxins -- PART III: THE FUTURE -- 10. The BTWC and CWC Facing Scientific Change -- 11. Where are We Going? -- 12. The Governance of Dual-Use Neuroscience.