This paper provides security analysis of lightweight block cipher Lilliput, which is an instantiation of extended generalized Feistel network (EGFN) developed by Berger et al. at SAC 2013. Its round function updates a part of the state only linearly, which yields several security concerns. The first important discovery is that the lower bounds of the number of active S-boxes provided by the designers are incorrect. Then the new bounds are derived by using mixed integer linear programming (MILP), which shows an interesting fact that the actual bounds are better than the designers originally expected. Another contribution is the best third-party cryptanalysis. Owing to its unique computation structure, the designers expected that EGFN efficiently enhances security against integral cryptanalysis. However, the security is not enhanced as the designers expect. In fact, division property, which is a new method to find integral distinguishers, finds a 13-round distinguisher which improves the previous distinguisher by 4 rounds. The new distinguisher is further extended to a 17-round key recovery attack which improves the previous best attack by 3 rounds.
CITATION STYLE
Sasaki, Y., & Todo, Y. (2017). New Differential Bounds and Division Property of Lilliput: Block Cipher with Extended Generalized Feistel Network. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 10532 LNCS, pp. 264–283). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-69453-5_15
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