Sometimes instead of believing or disbelieving a proposition one does not take a stand on it. This essay explores that middle ground. We begin by distinguishing a variety of different attitudes or cognitive relations one might have to a proposition that one does not believe or disbelieve. We argue that identifying all of them as suspending judgment or withholding judgment neglects important differences. We then discuss epistemic evaluations of these attitudes and relations. Finally, we examine the implications of our findings for the attitudes that a philosopher might take toward contentious philosophical theses. Evidentialism, our preferred view of epistemic justification, is helpful in clarifying the issues and addressing the problems.
CITATION STYLE
Feldman, R., & Conee, E. (2018). Between Belief and Disbelief. In Synthese Library (Vol. 398, pp. 71–89). Springer Science and Business Media B.V. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95993-1_6
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