Two-dimensional adaptive dynamics of evolutionary public goods games: Finite-size effects on fixation probability and branching time

Abstract

Public goods games (PGGs) describe situations in which individuals contribute to a good at a private cost, but others can free-ride by receiving a share of the public benefit at no cost. The game occurs within local neighbourhoods, which are subsets of the whole population. Free-riding and maximal production are two extremes of a continuous spectrum of traits. We study the adaptive dynamics of production and neighbourhood size. We allow the public good production and the neighbourhood size to coevolve and observe evolutionary branching. We explain how an initially monomorphic population undergoes evolutionary branching in two dimensions to become a dimorphic population characterized by extremes of the spectrum of trait values. We find that population size plays a crucial role in determining the final state of the population. Small populations may not branch or may be subject to extinction of a subpopulation after branching. In small populations, stochastic effects become important and we calculate the probability of subpopulation extinction. Our work elucidates the evolutionary origins of heterogeneity in local PGGs among individuals of two traits (production and neighbourhood size), and the effects of stochasticity in two-dimensional trait space, where novel effects emerge.