Self-Trust and Social Truth

Abstract

Self-trust (Lehrer 1997) is, I have argued, central in what one accepts and prefers. The argument is that the evaluation of belief and desire and the assumption that one is trustworthy in such evaluation is a condition of reasonableness. I should have argued that the evaluation of emotion and feeling is equally a condition. The positive evaluation of belief in terms of background information yields acceptance of what one believes. Similarly, the positive evaluation of desire yields the preference to obtain what is desired. Moreover, such evaluation, notably when it is reflective, involves trusting oneself and, implicitly, the acceptance of one’s trustworthiness in such evaluation. If one fails to accept that one is trustworthy or fails to prefer being trustworthy, the assumption that such evaluation is reasonable is defeated. On the other hand, the combination of acceptance that one is trustworthy and preference for being trustworthy, when successful yields the further conclusion that one is reasonable in what one accepts and prefers.