In this paper, we analyze the security vulnerabilities of SSL-MAP, an ultra-lightweight RFID mutual authentication protocol recently proposed by Rama N, Suganya R. We present two effective attacks, a de-synchronization attack and a full-disclosure attack, against this protocol. The former permanently disables the authentication capability of a RFID tag by destroying synchronization between the tag and the RFID reader. The latter completely threats a tag by extracting all the secret information that are stored in the tag. The de-synchronization attack can be carried out in three round of interaction in SSL-MAP while the full-disclosure attack is accomplished across several runs of SSL-MAP. We also discuss ways to counter the attacks. © 2011 Springer-Verlag.
CITATION STYLE
Kianersi, M., Gardeshi, M., & Yousefi, H. (2011). Security analysis of ultra-lightweight protocol for low-cost RFID tags: SSL-MAP. In Communications in Computer and Information Science (Vol. 162 CCIS, pp. 236–245). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-21937-5_22
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